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Abstract
Aim On August 4, 2020, a massive explosion hit Lebanon’s capital city, Beirut. The aim of this study was to explore the effect of
the Beirut blast on the COVID-19 situation in the country.
Subject and Methods Data on COVID-19 were retrieved from the Lebanese Ministry of Public Health (LMOPH), where all the
COVID-19 positive cases were reported. The study was divided into two periods, considering the incubation period of the
COVID-19 virus: (July 27–August 9, 2020) and (August 10–23, 2020). Information obtained included daily number of cases,
tests, deaths, hospitalized patients, intensive care unit (ICU) patients, and mode of acquisition (local vs. expat). Daily positivity
rates were reported per 100 tests. An independent sample t-test and a Joinpoint regression analysis were used to determine
significance. A p value less than 0.05 was considered significant.
Results A total of 201,010 tests were conducted during our studied period, with 8993 positive cases, constituting a total positivity
rate of 4.5 per 100 tests. Case fatality rate over the studied period was 0.8%. The positivity rate of the period prior to August 10,
2020, was 2.7 per 100 tests, significantly less than that of the period following the explosion, which was 6.4 per 100 tests
(p < 0.001). During our studied period, daily positivity rates were significantly increasing at a slope of 0.29 (p < 0.001). A
significant increase in slope was noted on August 13, 2020 (p < 0.001). The number of hospitalized patients increased from
139 patients on July 27 to 266 on August 23, 2020, and that of ICU patients increased from 36 to 75.
Conclusion The port of Beirut explosion resulted in a significant increase in the daily number of positive COVID-19 cases. The
aftermath of the explosion, the damage to healthcare facilities, and the overcrowding due to emergency efforts were contributing
factors to that increase.
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Introduction
The first case of the novel coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) in
Lebanon was diagnosed on February 21, 2020 (MOPH 2020).
At that time, the Lebanese people had many other ordeals to
deal with, and the COVID-19 pandemic further exacerbated
their challenging situation. Social and political turmoil had
erupted earlier in the country, after popular uprisings emerged
against the corruption and mismanagement of the political
regime (Neal and Tansey 2020; Nuwayhid and Zurayk
2019). In addition, an economic crisis evident by the collapse
of the banking system and a shortage of foreign currency led
the country to bankruptcy, and its citizens to detrimental levels
of poverty (Neal and Tansey 2020; Nuwayhid and Zurayk
2019). Concurrently, COVID-19 struck Lebanon and led to
a multifaceted impact on the health, economic and educational
sectors, among others (Bizri et al. 2020).
Initially, the Lebanese government took quick action to
help limit the spread of the disease (MOPH 2020; Bizri et al.
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2020). A nationwide lockdown took place, curfews were set,
and learning institutions were temporarily closed (MOPH
2020; Bizri et al. 2020). While these non-pharmacologic mea-
sures were relatively successful in hindering the spread of the
epidemic, their social and economic repercussions were detri-
mental and devastating (MOPH 2020; Bizri et al. 2020). The
government was forced to start gradually easing off the restric-
tions and began reopening the country allowing expats to
return, leading to a nationwide increase in the number of
COVID-19 cases (MOPH 2020; Bizri et al. 2020).
On August 4, 2020, a massive explosion hit the capital city
of Beirut, resulting in more than 190 deaths, 6000 injuries,
10–15 billion USD worth of property damage, and displacing
300,000 people from their homes (Devi 2020). The cata-
strophic blast was linked to approximately 2700 tons of con-
fiscated ammonium nitrate that had been stored in the port
without proper safety measures (Devi 2020). The explosion
damaged many nearby hospitals, overcrowded healthcare fa-
cilities with patients, and reignited the popular uprising
against the political regime (Devi 2020). Amid the already
limited medical resources and supplies, the COVID-19 situa-
tion in the country had never been worse.
The aim of this study is to explore the epidemiological trends
of the COVID-19 pandemic in Lebanon prior to, and after
August 4, 2020, to assess the impact of the Beirut blast on the
healthcare system of the country and its COVID-19 response.
Methods
Study design
In this descriptive analysis, we attempt to explore the catastrophic
impact of the Beirut blast on the already debilitating COVID-19
burden in the Lebanese population. A relevant literature review
pertaining to the topic was conducted. Daily COVID-19 reports
were screened and analyzed up until August 23, 2020. The data
were deidentified and publicly accessible from the LMOPH
Epidemiologic Surveillance Unit website (MOPH 2020). Our
database included the number of new cases, total cases, deaths,
tests conducted, hospitalized patients, and status of cases (locals
vs expats). COVID-19 is known to have approximately 4–7 days
of incubation; hence, cases that occurred on August 4th would
probably be detected around the 9th of August (Li et al. 2020). In
addition, the Lebanese government imposed a lockdown that
started in late August. Accordingly, in order to alienate con-
founding variables due to the lockdown imposed, and taking into
account the incubation period of COVID-19, we chose to define
our study period between July 27–August 23, 2020. We also
divided the study period into two time intervals: July 27–
August 9, 2020 (cases occurring prior to the Beirut blast), and
August 10–23, 2020 (cases occurring due to the Beirut blast).
Data analysis
In order to remove bias when comparing between the two time
periods, we divided the number of daily cases by the number
of daily tests conducted. Accordingly, positivity rates were
reported per 100 tests. An independent sample t-test was used
to check for any statistical significances between the mean
incidence rates of the two periods. The Joinpoint regression
analysis tool was then used to assess whether any significant
changes occurred with respect to the trends of COVID-19
incidence during our studied period. For Joinpoint, we used
a grid search model, with a maximum of 1 Joinpoint due to the
relatively short time period under study. The model selection
method was chosen to be permutation test, and the error op-
tions were set as to fit an uncorrelated errors model. A p value
less than 0.05 was considered significant.
Results
A total of 201,010 tests were conducted during our study
period (July 27–August 23, 2020); out of which, 8993 cases
had a positive result, constituting a positivity rate of 4.5 per
100 tests (Fig. 1). Out of the 8993 positive cases, 8652 (96%)
were of local origin, while 341 (4%) were from expats enter-
ing the country. In addition, a total of 72 deaths occurred
during our study period, constituting a case fatality rate of
0.8%. The number of hospitalized patients was 139 on
July 27th, with 36 patients residing in the intensive care unit
(ICU). This number rose to 266 patients on August 23rd, out
of which 75 resided in the ICU (Fig. 2). The positivity rate
over the entire studied period reported a significantly increas-
ing slope of 0.29 (p < 0.001). When assessing for a significant
change in slope during our studied period, a Joinpoint change
onAugust 11, 2020 showed a significant increase from a slope
of 0.18 (July 27–August 11, 2020) to 0.6 (August 12–23,
2020) (p < 0.001) (Fig. 1).
Before the Beirut blast (July 27–August 9, 2020)
A total of 104,210 tests (52%) were conducted in the month
prior to the Beirut blast; out of which 2812 cases (31%) had a
positive result, constituting a positivity rate of 2.7 per 100
tests. This rate was significantly lower than that reported in
the month following the Beirut blast (p < 0.001; CI[−5.4,–
2.6]). Out of the 2812 positive cases, 2637 (94%) were local
cases, whereas 175 (6%) were expats. A total of 25 deaths
occurred during this period, constituting a case fatality rate
of 0.9%. As of August 9, 2020, there were 184 hospitalized
patients, 40 of which were residing in the ICU (Fig. 2). The
positivity rate of this period had a significantly increasing
slope of 0.16 (p < 0.001) (Fig. 3a).
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After the Beirut blast (August 10–23, 2020)
A total of 96,800 tests (48%) were conducted in the month
following the Beirut blast; out of which 6181 (69%) had a
positive result, constituting a positivity rate of 6.4 per 100
tests. This rate was significantly higher than that reported in
the month prior to the Beirut blast (p < 0.001; CI[−5.4,–2.6]).
Out of the 6181 positive cases, 6015 (97%) were local cases,
while 166 (3%) were expats. A total of 47 deaths occurred
during this month, constituting a case fatality rate of 0.8%. As
of August 23, 2020, there were 266 hospitalized patients, out
of which 75 were residing in the ICU (Fig. 2). The positivity
rate of this period had a significantly increasing slope of 0.46
(p < 0.001) (Fig. 3b).
Discussion
The period following the Beirut blast showed a significantly
higher daily COVID-19 positivity rates, number of deaths,
Fig. 1 Trendline showing the daily COVID positive cases reported (per 100 tests) during our studied period (July 27–August 23, 2020)
Fig. 2 Trend showing the number
of hospitalized patients and ICU
patients during our studied period
(July 27–August 23, 2020)
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and a higher increasing slope when compared to the period
prior to the explosion. In addition, the number of hospitalized
patients and those residing in the ICU increased by more than
twofold. A point of significant change in slope was shown on
the 13th of August. Considering the fact that COVID-19 has
an incubation period of approximately 5 days, these findings
emphasize the impact of the Beirut blast on the already strug-
gling health sector in Lebanon, and the major setbacks that
ensued regarding the COVID-19 situation, as a result.
COVID-19 situation prior to Beirut blast
After the first wave of COVID-19 hit Lebanon in
March 2020, the government quickly took decisive actions
and strict measures to help limit the spread of the disease
(Bizri et al. 2020). The crisis-stricken country initiated a
total lockdown: the airport was closed for visitors and ex-
pats, restaurants and businesses were disrupted, and schools
and universities adopted online-teaching protocols to help
contain disease spread (Bizri et al. 2020; Azhari 2020). In
addition, a public curfew was set, and masks were made
mandatory in public spaces (Khamis 2019). This took a toll
on the population’s socioeconomic status as many people
lost their jobs, businesses had to shut down, and inflation
was rising (Bizri et al. 2020; Aawast 2020). In addition, the
country’s financial sector was suffering, as the airport clo-
sure exacerbated the already existing shortage of foreign
currency (Bizri et al. 2020; Trading Economics 2020).
Around late May, the government decided to reopen the
country, after COVID-19 incidence reached minimal rates:
the airport was reopened to visitors, restaurants and busi-
nesses were allowed to reopen with limited capacity, and the
public curfew was lifted (Knecht 2020). Soon enough,
COVID-19 cases started to increase progressively, but not
at an alarming rate that would require significant measures
(MOPH 2020).
Fig. 3 Trend of the daily COVID
positivity rates (per 100 tests) in
the time period prior to the Beirut
blast (a) [slope = 0.16 per 100
tests], and the period following
the Beirut blast (b) [slope = 0.46
per 100 tests]
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Consequences of the Beirut blast
On August 4, 2020, a harrowing blast was heard all over the
country, wreaking havoc to the capital and its inhabitants. The
blast radius affected a huge portion of the city and caused
substantial damage to the health sector; at least one hospital
was completely out of function, and three others were signif-
icantly damaged and disrupted (Fig. 4) (Dyer 2020). To exac-
erbate the already challenging healthcare situation, within mi-
nutes, the remaining hospitals in the capital were flooded with
thousands of cases affected by the blast (Dyer 2020).
Emergency protocols were implemented, volunteering medi-
cal staff and personnel flooded to the scene, blood banks were
in desperate need of donors, and patients were treated in below
par conditions (Dyer 2020). The urgent crowded nature of the
disaster sidelined COVID-19 infection prevention and control
(IPC) protocols, caused mass gatherings around hospitals, and
shifted resources dedicated to COVID-19 toward dealing with
the Beirut blast casualties.
In addition, and following the explosion, the city’s popula-
tion took to the streets, and mass gatherings took place (Devi
2020; OxfordAnalytica 2020a; OxfordAnalytica 2020b). The
ammonium nitrate stores were stored improperly next to fire-
works and other flammable materials, and the details behind
their presence in the port remained ambiguous (Devi 2020).
As a result, massive demonstrations were held to protest the
government’s incompetence and negligence, and this led to
the government’s resignation (Oxford Analytica 2020a;
Oxford Analytica 2020b; Oxford Analytica 2020c).
Moreover, many volunteers rushed to help clean up the city,
conduct minor rehabilitation of households, and prepare and
distribute meals for the homeless (Devi 2020; Homsi 2020).
Concurrently, thousands of displaced families were in desper-
ate need for proper shelter and housing, and manywere forced
to reside in crowded unsafe settings (Devi 2020; Homsi
2020). All these circumstances led to an increase in crowding
incidents with minimal or no IPC precautions applied.
Aftermath and impact on the COVID-19 situation
These factors were understandably associated with a spike in
COVID-19 cases in Lebanon. The daily number of positive
cases following the blast, along with the number of deaths,
increased prominently. Incidence rates started increasing sig-
nificantly approximately a week following the blast, which
makes sense given that the virus has an incubation period of
4–7 days (Li et al. 2020). To delineate this effect, the positivity
rate on August 4, 2020—date of the explosion—was 2.7 per
100 tests. Oneweek following the Beirut blast, that rate almost
doubled to 5.2 per 100 tests, and continued rising till it reached
a peak of 10.5 per 100 tests on August 22, 2020, 18 days
following the explosion. This rapid increase caused the
resigned government to implement a 2-week shutdown as of
late August to help prevent spread of the disease (Lebanon
Fig. 4 Impact of the Beirut blast on the surrounding area and nearby hospitals
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2020). The shutdown involved a public curfew and enforced
the temporary closure of restaurants and businesses; the air-
port was not closed due to the need of influx of foreign cur-
rency (Lebanon 2020). Some demographic features of the
spread were also altered, as the portion of expat patients de-
creased following the Beirut blast, probably due to the rise of
local cases, and the dissuasion of further expats from returning
to the country.
The Beirut blast posed many challenges to the already
struggling healthcare sector in Lebanon (Farha and Abi
Jaoude 2020). The country was already suffering from the
limited medical resources, protective equipment and hospital
beds available for COVID-19. The blast further exacerbated
the situation by inflicting significant damage to a number of
nearby hospitals in the city, overflooding the remaining hos-
pitals with cases, displacing thousands of families without
proper care or shelter, and shifting the resources toward deal-
ing with injured individuals (Devi 2020; Dyer 2020; Lebanon
2020). In addition, the mass gatherings that followed the blast
did not adhere to IPC measures, and hence, increased the risk
of further spread (Oxford Analytica 2020a; Oxford Analytica
2020b). Amid the horrific tragedy of the Beirut blast, an un-
derlying healthcare disaster was slowly growing. Effective
measures needed to be implemented swiftly in order to help
prevent further spread of the disease. Strict quarantine mea-
sures were set, foreign aid was requested, and additional hos-
pitals were recruited to help increase the medical resources
available to combat the pandemic, amidst this horrifying
tragedy.
Limitations
To our knowledge, this is the first Lebanese study to address,
both quantitively and qualitatively, the impact of the Beirut
blast on the COVID-19 situation in the country. Nevertheless,
a few limitations exist. Our data were limited by the retrospec-
tive nature of this study, and thus, additional variables and
associations could not have been explored. Moreover, we re-
lied on the MOPH website to extrapolate the number of
COVID-19 patients in the country; this number could have
been under-reported due to the stigmatization of the disease,
and hesitancy to contact government officials.
Conclusion
The Beirut blast hit the city on August 4, 2020, causing
immense challenges with respect to the health sector and
the current COVID-19 situation in Lebanon. The crises-
stricken country was already struggling with the limited
medical resources attained for combatting the virus, and
the explosion only managed to exacerbate the situation.
Hospitals were wrecked, medical resources were
consumed, hospital beds were filled with casualties, and
preventive measures were ignored.
Aside from the psychologic and socioeconomic impact of
the blast, its effects on the COVID-19 pandemic were detri-
mental. Desperate measures are needed to help the health sec-
tor regain its ground, and these include financial reimburse-
ment, foreign aid requests, strict public measures, and recruit-
ment of additional hospitals for managing COVID-19
patients.
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